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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the “finance” part of the subprime mortgage crisis. In a
separate article, I examined financial-market anomalies and obvious market
protections that failed, seeking insight into the subprime mortgage crisis.2 The
crisis, I argued, can be attributed in large part to three causes: conflicts,
complacency, and complexity.3 This article focuses on the third cause—
complexity—and, in particular, on complexity’s undermining of the disclosure
paradigm of securities law, causing investors such as commercial and investment
banks to lose many billions of dollars on securities backed by subprime
mortgages.4
1

This article is partly based on portions of Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter,
Schwarcz, Disclosure Paradigm], and Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets:
Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107444 [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets].
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2
See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1.
3
Id. at 33–35. Running throughout these causes is a fourth cause: cupidity, but greed
is “so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other categories that it adds
little insight to view it as a separate category.” Id. at 34–35.
4
See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Banks Confront a String of Write-Downs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at C1 (reporting that “major banks . . . have already written off more
than $120 billion of losses stemming from bad mortgage-related investments”); Daniel
Gross et al., How a Lack of Faith Pounded the Markets, N EWSWEEK , Mar. 31,
2008, at 48 (reporting that Bear Stearns was worth $20 billion in January 2007
and that JP Morgan agreed to buy Bear Stearns for $236 million in March 2008);
Wall Street Banks Slashing Workforces, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 2008, at C2 (reporting
that “[t]he collapse of the subprime mortgage market last year and the ensuing credit
contraction have saddled the world’s largest financial institutions with at least $200 billion
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Most, if not all, of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for
securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed,5 yet the disclosure was
insufficient, in part because complexity made the risks very difficult to understand.
The prospectus itself in a typical offering of these securities is, in my experience,
hundreds of pages long.6 Thus, “a lot of institutional investors bought [the
subprime mortgage-backed] securities substantially based on their ratings [without
fully understanding what they bought], in part because the market has become so
complex.”7
This article will explain why these risks were so difficult to understand, even
to sophisticated institutional investors, and then will analyze how to address
disclosure’s insufficiency. As groundwork for this explanation and analysis, the
article next lays out some basic industry terminology.

of write-downs and losses”). These losses have been mostly from investments in securities
backed by subprime mortgages and not from making subprime mortgage loans. See David
Bogoslaw, A Red Flag for Bank Liquidity, B US . W K ., Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.
businessweek.com/investor/content/mar2008/pi20080316_508940.htm (reporting
that Bear Stearns’ “exposure to the toxic securities backed by subprime mortgages, such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), has hardly been unique”).
5
In certain pending lawsuits, plaintiffs argue that disclosure regarding the “quality of
the [underlying mortgage] loans” was insufficient. Stephen J. Crimmins, Andrew J. Morris
& Daniel T. Brown, Subprime Mortgage Lending: Possible Securities Litigation Exposure,
SEC. REG. & LAW, Sept. 24, 2007. Thus,
plaintiffs [generally] appear to be focusing on disclosures relating to the quality
of the loans, and adherence to procedures designed to ensure loan quality.
Shareholders suing Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co. claim that it
misrepresented that it was committed to originating “high-quality loans” and
would “constantly track the factors that impact portfolio quality”; that it instead
permitted “rampant overrides” of negative credit appraisals; and that it
“manipulated” reserves for bad loans in violation of GAAP. A shareholder suit
against Fremont General Corp. claims that it failed to disclose that it had
“inadequate underwriting criteria,” “a large volume of poor quality loans,” and
“unsatisfactory lending practices,” and that it marketed adjustable rate
mortgages “to subprime borrowers in an unsafe and unsound manner” and
“without adequately considering the borrower’s ability to repay.”
Id. (citations omitted).
6
The disclosure documents ordinarily consist of a prospectus and a prospectus
supplement, each close to two-hundred pages long.
7
Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 15, 2007, at A1 (quoting a market observer). See also Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of
Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at BU4 (arguing that the
securities backed by subprime mortgages “were probably too complex for anyone’s good”).
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II. TERMINOLOGY
The issuance of securities backed by subprime mortgages constitutes a form
of “securitization.”8 In a securitization transaction, rights to payment from incomeproducing financial assets—in our case, subprime mortgage loans—are transferred
to a special-purpose vehicle, or “SPV” (sometimes called a special-purpose entity,
or “SPE”).9 The SPV, directly or indirectly, issues securities to capital market
investors and uses the proceeds to pay for the mortgage loans. The investors, who
are repaid from collections of the mortgage loans, buy the securities based on their
assessments of the value of those loans.10
In the securitizations involving subprime mortgages, the companies
originating the mortgage loans were almost always different than the companies
that (after purchasing those loans) created and transferred those loans to the
SPVs.11 For discussion purposes, this article will refer to all these companies
collectively as “originators,” in contrast to “investors” who buy the securities
issued by the SPVs.
Actual securitization transactions are extremely complex and often rely on
multiple SPVs.12 Furthermore, in order to integrate disparate disciplines such as
bankruptcy, tax, securities law, commercial law, accounting, and finance,
securitization transactions often appear to be highly convoluted.13
The securities issued in securitization transactions add to the complexity.
Securities backed directly or indirectly by subprime mortgages “are customarily
categorized as MBS, . . . CDO, or ABS CDO” securities.14

8

See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
9
Id.
10
Id. For a more complete analysis of securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed.
2003 & supp.); Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539,
1540–43 (2004) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron]; Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 135–44 (1994).
11
See Kurt Eggert, Role of Securitization in Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil,
CONG. Q., Apr. 17, 2007 (explaining that mortgage brokers and banks made the loans, and
that investment banks generally bought those loans, created the SPVs, and transferred the
loans to the SPVs).
12
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1063 (1996).
13
See Schwarcz, Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 1, at 5 (illustrating a “simplified”
schematic of a healthcare securitization conduit established by a leading investment firm,
with the author’s counsel, in order to provide low-cost financing to hospitals).
14
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 4–5. There are arcane
variations on the CDO categories, such as CDOs “squared” or “cubed,” but these go
beyond this article’s analysis.
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MBS means mortgage-backed securities, or securities whose payment
derives principally or entirely from mortgage loans owned by the SPV.
. . . CDO, or collateralized debt obligation, securities are backed by—and
thus their payment derives principally or entirely from—a mixed pool of
mortgage loans and/or other [income-generating assets] owned by an
SPV.15
“ABS CDO securities, in contrast, are backed by a mixed pool” of MBS and
other asset-backed securities owned by the SPV,16 and thus their payment derives
principally or entirely from the underlying mortgage loans and/or other assets
ultimately backing those securities.17
The classes, or tranches, of MBS, . . . CDO, and ABS CDO
securities issued in these [securitization] transactions are typically ranked
by seniority of payment priority. The highest priority class is called
senior securities. In MBS . . . transactions, lower priority classes are
called subordinated or junior securities. In CDO and ABS CDO
transactions, lower priority classes are usually called mezzanine
securities—with the lowest priority class, which has a residual claim
against the SPV, being called the equity. The senior and many of the
subordinated classes of these securities are more highly rated than the
quality of the underlying mortgage loans. For example, senior securities
issued in a CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if the
underlying [income-generating assets] consist of subprime mortgages,
and senior securities issued in an ABS CDO transaction are usually rated
AAA even if none of the MBS and ABS securities supporting the
transaction are rated that high. This is accomplished by allocating cash
collections from the receivables first to pay the senior classes and
thereafter to pay more junior classes. In this way, the senior classes are
highly over-collateralized to take into account the possibility, indeed
likelihood, of delays and losses on collection.18
Before engaging in the analysis below, it is helpful to distinguish the scope of
this symposium article from that of an earlier article examining disclosure’s
insufficiency in the face of complexity.19 The earlier article examined disclosure’s
insufficiency from the standpoint of investors in an originator’s securities, such as
shares of stock. In contrast, this symposium article examines disclosure’s
insufficiency from the standpoint of investors in an SPV’s securitized securities.
15

Id. at 4–5.
Securities backed by assets other than mortgage loans are typically referred to as
asset-backed securities or ABS. Id. at 4.
17
Id. at 5.
18
Id. at 5–6.
19
That earlier article is Schwarcz, Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 1.
16
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These different focuses lead to different potential solutions. For example, the
earlier article proposes as a partial solution to disclosure’s insufficiency that
originators should mitigate any material conflicts of interest that create the risk that
their management will structure transactions contrary to the interests of investors,
at least in those transactions for which disclosure may be insufficient.20 The
reasoning of that article is that, “absent conflicts, investors should be able to rely
on the business judgment of the originator’s management,” which has a fiduciary
duty to those investors, in “setting up structured transactions for the originator’s
benefit.”21 However, that solution is inapplicable to this symposium article because
originators have no such duty to investors in an SPV’s securities.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disclosure’s Insufficiency
In the subprime mortgage crisis, there is to date relatively little dispute that
the disclosure documents describing the MBS, CDO, and ABS CDO securities and
their risks generally complied with the federal securities laws.22 The complexity of
the transactions, however, caused the disclosures to be insufficient, cutting into the
very heart of federal securities regulation, whose “exclusive focus is on full
disclosure.”23 The rationale for this focus is that investors are adequately protected
if all relevant aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly
disclosed. The reasoning is that full disclosure provides investors with sufficient
opportunity to evaluate the merits of an investment and fend for themselves. It is a
basic tenet of federal securities regulation that investors’ ability to make their own
evaluations of available investments obviates any need for the more costly and
time-consuming governmental merit analysis of the securities being offered.24
There are two levels of reasoning that explain the insufficiency of disclosure
in the subprime crisis. On an institutional level (most investors in MBS, CDO, and
ABS CDO securities being institutional investors25), some investors simply may
20

Id., at 30–37.
Id., at 32.
22
Cf. supra note 5 and accompanying text (observing that most if not all of the risks
giving rise to the collapse of the market for these securities were disclosed, though
discussing several lawsuits alleging failure to disclose certain risks about the quality of the
underlying mortgage loans).
23
2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 8.1[1][B] (5th ed.
2005); see also id. § 1.2[3] (explaining that “[t]he focus on disclosure was based on the
conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant”).
24
1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] (5th ed.
2005).
25
See SEC Staff Report: Enhancing Disclosure in the Mortgage-Backed Securities
Markets (Jan. 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm (reporting that
investors in MBS are “overwhelmingly institutional”).
21
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not have the staffing to evaluate complex securitization transactions.26 This begs
the question whether institutional investors will hire securitization experts as
needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests they do not always do
so,27 and theory explains why. Although experts may be hired to the extent that
their costs do not exceed the benefits gained from more fully understanding the
complexity, at some level of complexity those costs will exceed, or at least appear
to exceed any potential gain. This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible,
whereas the benefit gained from fully understanding complex transactions is
intangible and harder to quantify. Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may
well give greater weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible
benefit.28 The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the
more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of equilibrium.
The second level of reasoning goes to agency costs stemming from a conflict
between the interests of individual employees and the institutions for which they
work.29 In assessing the investment-worthiness of highly complex MBS, CDO, and
ABS CDO securities, individuals sometimes take a shortcut, over-relying on the
fact that these securities may be rated “investment grade” by rating agencies such
as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s30 and not spending the time and effort needed
to fully understand the hundreds of pages of disclosure for each investment.31

26

In this context, some commentators have questioned whether some structures are
getting so complex that they are incomprehensible. See, e.g., David Barboza, Complex El
Paso Partnerships Puzzle Analysts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2002, at C1 (discussing that “one
industry giant, the El Paso Corporation, is growing ever more reliant on deals [using offbalance sheet partnerships] so complex that securities experts call them
incomprehensible”). That appears hyperbolic, however, since if humans create the
structures then humans can decipher them. The problem, however, is that relatively few can
do so and some structures may not even be able to be understood by any single person. See,
e.g., KARL R. POPPER & KONRAD LORENZ, DIE ZUKUNFT IST OFFEN 74, 75–76 (Franz
Kreuzer ed., 1985) (arguing that some structures, like airplanes, contain so many ideas that
they are not comprehensible to any one individual; hence they require collaboration).
27
See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233,
1238–39 (2002) (noting the failure of investors to draw proper conclusions from their lack
of understanding).
28
The difficulties associated with balancing tangible costs against intangible benefits
have been examined extensively in the context of corporate information-system (“IS”)
decision-making. See, e.g., Edward Rivard & Kate Kaiser, The Benefit of Quality IS,
DATAMATION, Jan. 15, 1989, at 53–58 (emphasizing the need to educate management,
“especially conservative management, on the importance of intangible benefits”).
29
See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 12.
30
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (discussing ratings and the concept of “investment
grade”).
31
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Over-reliance on ratings appears to have been endemic in the subprime mortgage
crisis.32
This over-reliance is not surprising, particularly where the type of investment
securities are generally accepted in the marketplace, as were securities backed by
subprime mortgages prior to the meltdown. Professors Healy and Palepu have
found, for example, that investment-fund managers who believe a stock is
overvalued, but nonetheless follow the crowd, will not be blamed if the stock
ultimately crashes.33 Moreover, the very complexity of securities backed by
subprime mortgages makes it difficult to assess their suitability for investment,
potentially seducing individuals into seeing what they are already inclined to
believe—that these securities are creditworthy.34 For these reasons, disclosure of
the subprime mortgage securitizations, and by analogy, of other complex financing
transactions, has inherent limitations.
B Addressing Disclosure’s Insufficiency
There are at least three ways to respond to disclosure’s insufficiency: to
tolerate insufficient disclosure; to proscribe transactions for which disclosure is
insufficient; or to require supplemental protections to minimize disclosure’s
insufficiencies. This article next examines each of these possible responses.

32

Aaron Lucchetti, Moody’s Weighs Warning Labels For Its Ratings—Firm
Aims to Appease Regulators, Rehabilitate A Battered Reputation, WALL ST. J., Feb.
5, 2008, at C1 (reporting that Moody’s believes investors relied too much on its ratings).
33
Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 19
(2003) (noting that nonindex fund managers are rewarded based on fund size and relative
performance; fund manager who estimates a stock is overvalued but does not act on this
analysis and “simply follows the crowd will not be rewarded for foreseeing the problems,”
“but neither will [he] be blamed for a poor investment decision when the stock ultimately
crashes, since [his peers] made the same mistake”).
34
It is reported, for example, that King Croesus of Lydia wanted to make war on
Cyrus, but was wary of doing so without heavenly sanction. After singling out the Delphic
Oracle as the most reliable, the king’s messengers “asked the practical question about the
advisability of Croesus’ going to war, and received the famous [and famously ambiguous]
response that ‘Croesus by crossing the Halys would destroy a mighty kingdom.’” REV. T.
DEMPSEY, THE DELPHIC ORACLE: ITS EARLY HISTORY, INFLUENCE, AND FALL 70 (1972).
Croesus interpreted this to mean what he wanted to hear—that Cyrus would fall—but in
fact the empire that fell was his own. Id. at 71; see also id. at 71, 107 (discussing the
historical method of the oracles as sheltering ignorance behind a “studied ambiguity” and
vagueness). This same method of response is said also to be used today by fortune tellers.
See J. Barkley Rosser Jr., Alternative Keynesian and Post Keynesian Perspectives on
Uncertainty and Expectations, 23 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 545, 554–57 (2001) (arguing
that uncertainty leads to self-fulfilling mistakes).
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1. Tolerating Insufficient Disclosure
Under this response, disclosure would remain the sole paradigm for
remedying the information asymmetry between originators and investors. This has
been the historical response to complexity since, in an efficient market, it has been
believed that stock prices virtually “instantaneously reflect all publicly available
information relevant to the value of traded stocks.”35 But complex securitization
transactions can undermine this result—as the subprime mortgage crisis has well
illustrated—because many securitization deals are sui generis, obviating creation
of a thickly efficient market. Thus, Professors Gilson and Kraakman observe that
an innovative investment contract, for example, would take the market more time
to understand and reach price equilibration than, say, a change in Federal Reserve
Board policy.36 Furthermore, the efficient market hypothesis might not even apply
to debt markets37 and certainly should not apply to private debt markets.38 The
securities issued in securitization transactions are virtually always debt securities,39
and many CDO and ABS CDO securities were issued in private placements.40 It
does not even appear that ABS CDO securities always had a secondary market for
trading.
The other possible argument for tolerating insufficient disclosure is that—at
least after the subprime mortgage crisis—originators engaging in complex
transactions may find their share price discounted by investors.41 This is not,
35

CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 170–71 (3d ed. 1999) (referring to this belief as the “semi-strong”
form of the efficient market hypothesis).
36
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 568, 585, 615–16 (1984).
37
See Yedidia Z. Stern, A General Model for Corporate Acquisition Law, 26 J. CORP.
L. 675, 709 (2001) (“[S]tudies show that the bond market is not efficient; and therefore,
one cannot expect the market prices to compensate bondholders for the risks to which they
are exposed.”); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205,
242 (1988) (“There is evidence that the market for corporate bonds is not very efficient.
For many bond issues, it is not unusual to find infrequent trading activity and large spreads
between bid and asked prices.”) (citations omitted).
38
See Camden Asset Mgmt., L.P. v. Sunbeam Corp., No. 99-8275-CIV, slip op. at
31–36 (S.D. Fla. July 3, 2001) (stating that privately placed Rule 144A-exempt securities,
being thinly traded, do not have an efficient market).
39
See Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric
Information, 34 J. L EGAL S TUD . 161, 164 (2005) (explaining that the typical
securitization transaction involves the issuance of debt or debt-like securities).
40
See Jennifer Bethel & Allen Ferrell, Policy Issues Raised by Structured Products, at
12 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business,
Discussion Paper 560, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard/olin/papers/560
(explaining that “collateralized debt obligations are now overwhelmingly privately
placed”).
41
See Schwarcz, Disclosure Paradigm, supra note 1, at 20.
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however, a long-term solution because investors have short memories. Once past
financial crises recede in memory and investors are making money, investors
always “go for the gold.”42 Furthermore, discounting share price based on
complexity per se is inefficient since complexity sometimes is justified. Where
investors do not or cannot differentiate between justifiable and fraudulent or
excessive complexity, the market will discount in both cases—thereby driving out
otherwise beneficial complexity.43
For these reasons, it would be inexpedient to continue to tolerate disclosure as
the sole paradigm for remedying the information asymmetry between originators
and investors. The converse proposition, proscribing transactions for which
disclosure would be insufficient, is equally problematic, as discussed below.
2. Proscribing Transactions for Which Disclosure Would Be Insufficient
If government proscribed or banned transactions for which the information
asymmetry exceeds certain bounds, the most immediate consequence potentially
would be to eliminate many, if not most, securitization transactions. From a
societal standpoint, that result would be unfortunate. Securitization transactions are
widely used and accepted in the United States . . . . Often, these
transactions are efficient means of obtaining funding for their
participants while simultaneously achieving accounting, tax and
regulatory benefits of various types . . . . [They] reflect the innovation for
which the U.S. capital markets are known[,] . . . have many legitimate
uses and comprise a significant part of our capital markets.44

42

Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BUS.
WK., Mar. 29, 1993, at 34 (“Bondholders can—and will—fuss all they like. But the reality
is, their options are limited: higher returns or better protection. Most investors will continue
to go for the gold.”) (discussing, in the context of but several years after the “Marriott
split,” that investors favor higher interest rates over “event risk” covenants once examples
of events justifying the covenants have receded in memory, even though they could
reoccur).
43
See Charles Wilson, Adverse Selection, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 32, 32–33 (John Eatwell et al., eds., 1987) (noting that, in this scenario, “the
market allocation is almost always inefficient”).
44
First Interim Report of Neil Baston, Court Appointed Examiner at 22, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.enron.com/media/1st_Examiners_Report.pdf (noting, for example, that “total
outstanding mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities in the United States alone exceed
$6 trillion”).
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Indeed, securitization transactions are normally viewed as socially desirable.45
Despite the subprime mortgage crisis, securitization generally creates overall value
in the financial markets.46
Another reason that government should not want to proscribe transactions as a
means of controlling information asymmetry is that any such proscriptions could
create regulatory arbitrage incentives: parties would want to make transactions
appear to meet the regulatory requirements.47 For example, if the government were
to proscribe transactions for which the information asymmetry exceeded a
threshold level, then parties would attempt to structure those transactions in ways
that appear to reduce the asymmetry, as measured by the regulatory ban, below
that threshold. The end result could be socially undesirable: the regulatory
proscription is effectively bypassed, but the overall transaction costs rise due to the
expenses of lawyers and other advisors hired for that purpose. For these reasons,
regulators should not want to proscribe securitization transactions as a means of
controlling disclosure’s limitations.48
3. Requiring Supplemental Protections
The third possible response is to consider whether disclosure can be
buttressed by cost-effective, supplemental protections that minimize information
asymmetry or mitigate its consequences. Any such supplemental protections would
be in addition to, not in place of, disclosure since even insufficient disclosure
provides value by reducing information asymmetry, and disclosure has other
justifications beyond the asymmetric information problem.49
In thinking about supplemental protections, it is useful to take into account
economic theory on asymmetric information, especially that dealing with the so45

See, e.g., Hill, supra note 12, at 1085–111; Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron,
supra note 10.
46
See Xudong An, Yongheng Deng & Stuart A. Gabriel, Value Creation Through
Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market 3 (Feb. 18, 2008) (unpublished article,
electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095645).
47
Regulatory arbitrage occurs when parties design transactions—in this case,
financial transactions—to try to “reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by
differential regulations or laws.” Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of
Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
48
Regulatory philosophy in the United States is also shying away from prohibiting
categories of transactions. For example, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 lifted the ban on over-the-counter derivatives and also eliminated the ban on single
security futures contracts. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-554, §1(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763A-365 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11,
12, and 15 U.S.C.).
49
Disclosure also can be seen as a means to break the management monopoly over
corporate information, and is necessary because separation of ownership and control can
cause managers to maximize their own utility at the expense of investors. JAMES D. COX ET
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 246 (4th ed. 2004).
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called Lemons problem. Economists have asked: How do transactions ever occur if
the seller has more information than the buyer, and the information disparity
cannot be cured (at least at reasonable cost)? Why would a buyer ever be willing to
enter into a transaction? These same questions pertain to the problem of disclosure
in the face of complexity.
The Lemons problem was introduced and first systematically studied by using
the crude but intuitive example of the used-car market.50 One obvious solution is
for the seller to make guaranties, such as warranties on the sale of goods, in order
to shift the risk from the buyer to the seller. Other potential solutions include
governmental and private-sector certification of quality.
(a) Guaranties
In a securitization context, guaranties would likely take some form of investor
recourse to originators, including perhaps a “put” of securities back to the
investment banks structuring the transactions51 or requiring these investment banks
to retain at least a portion of the lowest ranked tranche of securities being sold.
Requiring originators to take a reasonable first-loss position generally makes sense
and typically is mandated by investors in securitizations of non-mortgage assets.52
Subject to the caveat discussed below, investors should consider extending this
mandate to securitizations of mortgage loans.
In the subprime mortgage crisis, however, this concept actually backfired. In
ABS CDO transactions, “[investment bankers] customarily purchased some
portion of the equity tranches at least in part in order to demonstrate their
(subsequently unjustified) confidence in the securities being sold.”53 This induced
many investors who otherwise might not have done so to purchase these securities,
thereby working against investor caution.54
This incongruity raises an important point about complexity: sometimes
things are so complex that the problem is not merely information asymmetry but
also information failure on both sides—in our case, originators as well as
investors. Thus, “[e]ven the people running Wall Street firms didn’t really [always]
understand what they were buying and selling.”55

50

See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
51
See supra note 11; Daniel Andrews, The Clean Up: Investors Need Better Advice
on Structured Finance Products, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 14, 14 (Sept. 2007) (quoting David
Doble, an industry professional, as suggesting some type of a put).
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Capital).
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(b) Certification of Quality
Another approach to protecting a buyer of securities is certification of their
quality either by the government or reputable private-sector entities.
Governmental certification is a form of merit regulation, and can be expensive. In
the context of the original enactment of the federal securities laws, it was explicitly
rejected as unworkable.56 There is little current literature on government
certification of securities quality because, until recently, disclosure was seen as the
complete answer.
Should we now reconsider some form of substantive governmental merit
regulation? Such merit regulation would by definition rely on government
employees to assess the quality of securities. It is doubtful that government
employees would do a better job than private-sector analysts, who already perform
this function for investors. The private-sector analysts are likely to be more
capable, on average, and also more accountable, because the government generally
pays lower salaries than the private sector,57 and government employees are often
harder to fire if they perform poorly.58 Furthermore, the imposition of
governmental merit regulation could perversely undermine the market for private
securities analysts, thereby eliminating any reduced information asymmetry
resulting from their analysis.
Private-sector certification of quality, in contrast, already exists in the form of
rating agencies (which are private companies notwithstanding the “agency”
moniker59), which rate debt securities based on their likelihood of timely
payment.60 Rating agencies, however, have not always proved effective in the face
of complexity.61 It is even being argued that rating agencies contributed to the
subprime mortgage meltdown by failing to downgrade securities backed by
subprime mortgages on a timely basis.62 Although rating agencies are now
56

See Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV.
607, 615 (1964) (arguing that “[t]he main argument for disclosure was that a regulatory
approach was not administratively practical”).
57
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58
See, e.g., Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 71 (2001).
59
See supra note 33, at 2.
60
See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999); supra note 30, at 3.
Recall that securities issued in securitization transactions are virtually always debt
securities. See supra note 39.
61
See, e.g., Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs 107th Cong. (2002) (hearing on rating agency
failure to predict Enron’s collapse).
62
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attempting to improve their credit rating capabilities,63 it is too soon to predict the
outcome.64 It is, however, important to strive to improve these capabilities because
rating agencies constitute a public good, creating an economy of scale to help
individual investors assess the creditworthiness of complex securities.65
Certification of the quality of securities, especially by private parties,
therefore can help but may not fully solve the asymmetric-information problem.
And in cases where there is not merely information asymmetry between originators
and investors but also information failure on the part of originators, certification by
originators can actually mislead investors.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As complexity increases, the disclosure paradigm of securities law has been
diminishing in effectiveness. This article suggests possible responses. For
example, investors could require originators to take a reasonable first-loss position,
although this backfired in the subprime mortgage crisis due to information failure
by originators. Institutional investors should also try to reduce agency costs
stemming from the conflict between the interests of individuals and the institutions
for which they work.66 Rating agencies should also try, as they now appear to be
doing, to increase the quality of their “private certification” via ratings of
securities.67
These are, admittedly, only second-best solutions, but there do not appear to
be any perfect solutions. “Government already takes a somewhat paternalistic
stance to mitigate disclosure’s inadequacy by mandating minimum investor
sophistication for investing in complex securities, yet sophisticated investors and
qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the very investors who lost the most
money in the subprime financial crisis. And any attempt by government to restrict

H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 47 (2007) (investigating the extent to which
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firms from engaging in complex transactions would be highly risky because of the
potential of inadvertently banning beneficial transactions.” 68
There is, finally, another way that disclosure failed in the subprime mortgage
crisis. Because “the motivation of market participants ‘is to protect themselves but
not the [financial] system as a whole,’”69 I have argued that “[d]isclosure alone
will be inadequate to prevent [a] systemic” collapse of the financial system.70
Investors are simply unlikely to care about disclosure to the extent it pertains to
this systemic risk. The remedy for disclosure’s failure in this case must depend on
separate protections to deter a systemic collapse.71
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Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008) (quoting THE
PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 31–32 (1999).
70
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining that “like
a tragedy of the commons, the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to
individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resource,
whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an
even wider class of persons”).
71
See Schwarcz, supra note 69.
69

